Smart Society : Community Service and Empowerment Journal
Volume 6, Issue 4, 1 - 11.
e_ISSN: 2807-5757
https://www.journal.foundae.com/index.php/smartsoc/index

Strengthening JAMPIDMIL's Authority in Handling Joint Civilian–Military Criminal Cases

Wahyoedho Indrajit*
Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani, INDONESIA

Zulfika Ikrardini
Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani, INDONESIA

Ferdian Rinaldi
Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani, INDONESIA

Article Info

Article history:

Received: Jul 22, 2026
Revised: Sep 27, 2026
Accepted: Oct 23, 2026

Keywords:

Joint Civilian–Military Criminal Cases;
JAMPIDMIL Authority;
Court Jurisdiction;
Effectiveness of Attorney General Guidelines.

Abstract

This article examines the statutory and institutional scope of the Deputy Attorney General for Military Criminal Affairs (JAMPIDMIL) in joint civilian–military criminal cases (perkara koneksitas), with particular attention to Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 and its relationship to Indonesia's 2025 Criminal Procedure Code. Using normative juridical analysis through statutory and conceptual approaches, the study compares prosecutorial authority, forum determination, and coordination across civilian and military justice institutions. The analysis identifies three normative concerns: optional military participation in some preliminary activities, divided central–regional accountability, and potentially prolonged coordination between prosecutors and military authorities. It also distinguishes the authority established in binding legislation from procedures established in an internal prosecutorial guideline. The TWP-AD corruption case is used solely as a pre-guideline illustration of connectivity proceedings, not as evidence of the 2025 guideline's effectiveness. The study argues that clearer allocation of procedural responsibility, written coordination requirements, and alignment with the new Criminal Procedure Code could improve legal certainty without displacing powers reserved by statute. These conclusions concern normative regulatory design rather than empirically measured implementation outcomes.

To cite this article: Indrajit, W., Ikrardini, Z., & Rinaldi, F. (2026). Strengthening JAMPIDMIL's Authority in Handling Joint Civilian–Military Criminal Cases. *Smart Society: Community Service and Empowerment Journal, 6*(4), 1-11.

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's constitutional commitment to the rule of law requires criminal jurisdiction to be established through legal authority rather than institutional preference (Republic of Indonesia, 1945). This requirement becomes difficult when a single offense involves both civilians and members of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), who are ordinarily subject to different judicial systems. In such connectivity cases (perkara koneksitas), the practical question is not simply which investigator handles a file, but who coordinates prosecutorial decisions and which court may adjudicate the joint offense. The separation between civilian and military jurisdiction serves different institutional purposes, yet it can also create procedural discontinuities when the same alleged conduct crosses both systems (Buaton, 2016). Comparative legal research similarly shows that the boundary between military discipline and general judicial guarantees is a recurring source of constitutional tension (Tahanout, 2024; Maddox, 2026). Accordingly, the legality of institutional coordination is central to evaluating JAMPIDMIL's mandate.

Within Indonesia's criminal justice system, military investigators, military prosecutors (Oditur), civilian investigators, and public prosecutors hold functions derived from different legal instruments. Law No. 31 of 1997 provides the foundation for military judicial proceedings, while the prosecution service exercises powers under Law No. 16 of 2004 as amended by Law No. 11 of 2021 (Republic of Indonesia, 1997, 2004, 2021). This institutional division complicates the processing of

* **Corresponding author:**
Wahyoedho Indrajit, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani, INDONESIA. ✉ wahyoedo49@gmail.com
© 2026 The Author(s). **Open Access.** This article is under the CC BY SA license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)

conduct committed together by persons belonging to both jurisdictions, especially at the points of investigation, case referral, and prosecution. An earlier analysis of the TNI legal administration identified approximately 2,080 cases from 2015 to 2019 that were considered potentially suitable for connectivity proceedings, although that figure does not establish how many were ultimately prosecuted through the prescribed mechanism (Mulyana et al., 2020). International sociolegal studies likewise distinguish the formal allocation of legal powers from the practices through which institutions exercise them (Bowman et al., 2024; Goldrosen, 2026). The Indonesian problem therefore requires analysis of both statutory mandates and the coordination structures intended to connect them.

JAMPIDMIL was introduced within the Attorney General's Office to bridge this institutional division and to operationalize the single prosecution system. Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2021 formally supported the institution's development, followed by changes to the prosecutorial organization, including Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2024 and Prosecutorial Regulation No. 3 of 2024 (President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021, 2024; Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, 2024). Its role is connected to the principle of dominus litis, under which the prosecutorial authority guides the legally defined prosecution process (Effendy, 2005; Arfianto et al., 2024). Research on prosecutorial decision-making cautions that the existence of coordinating authority does not in itself resolve organizational constraints or discretionary conflicts (Manzi, 2022; Green & Roth, 2025). The distinction matters because institutional integration must respect powers expressly conferred by statute on military officers and prosecutors. JAMPIDMIL's strengthening thus raises a question of legal design rather than a presumption that additional hierarchical power is always desirable.

Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 addresses the handling of connectivity cases and technical coordination of prosecutions by the Oditurat (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). It covers procedures involving initial complaints, preliminary inquiries, investigation, pre-prosecution, prosecution, judgment enforcement, and subsequent legal measures. However, the guideline was established before Law No. 20 of 2025 on the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) entered into force on 2 January 2026 and replaced Law No. 8 of 1981 (Republic of Indonesia, 1981, 2025). This temporal sequence creates an additional issue of regulatory alignment: procedures originally framed under the previous Code must now be read together with the current statutory rules on connectivity cases. Studies of prosecution guidelines show that the legal specificity of internal rules and the responses of other institutional actors influence how such rules operate (Nguyen & Ouss, 2026; Ward et al., 2025). The important analytical question is therefore whether the guideline assigns each institutional responsibility clearly and consistently with higher-ranking legislation.

Earlier scholarship in Indonesia has explained JAMPIDMIL's position and its relationship with military prosecutorial institutions (Prabandari et al., 2022; Rafli & Triadi, 2023). Research on the harmonization of prosecution agencies also treats the single prosecution system as an institutional objective while recognizing the difficulties of coordinating bodies with separate legal bases (Arfianto et al., 2024). International literature extends this debate by examining hierarchical dependence, prosecutor independence, and the limits of a coordinating authority that lacks direct control of other agencies (Mrowicki, 2026; van Sliedregt & Quackelbeen, 2026). Studies of legal institutions further emphasize how informal practices may preserve or weaken accountability even when formal standards appear clear (Šipulová & Kosař, 2023; Matthes, 2022). These perspectives are valuable, but they are not direct tests of Indonesian connectivity procedure. Their relevance is conceptual: they sharpen the distinction between legal competence, internal coordination, and implementation outcomes.

The remaining gap concerns the operational distribution of authority under the 2025 guideline and its relationship to the subsequently effective Criminal Procedure Code. Prior accounts establish the need for prosecutorial integration, yet they do not fully resolve whether early military participation is mandatory, how regional Aspidmil arrangements report within the broader prosecutorial hierarchy, or which institutional decision controls the formation of joint teams. Comparative research on legal institutions suggests that procedural legitimacy depends on transparent decision points, independent judgment, and reliable channels of accountability, rather than institutional consolidation alone (Bojarski, 2021; Puleo & Coman, 2024; Tew, 2024). Work on

judicial governance also identifies a recurring tension between administrative supervision and independent legal responsibility (Sanders & Faltinat, 2026; Tepelija, 2026). These studies do not establish facts about JAMPIDMIL, but they offer analytical contrasts for evaluating the adequacy of its legal design. A focused reading of the Indonesian norms can therefore contribute a more precise explanation of where coordination ends and direct legal authority begins.

This study examines the position of JAMPIDMIL and the potential legal weaknesses in its handling of joint civilian–military criminal cases under Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025. It asks how authority is distributed among JAMPIDMIL, Aspidmil, the Attorney General, public prosecutors, and military prosecutorial actors, and how this distribution relates to the rules on court jurisdiction in Law No. 20 of 2025. The article uses a normative juridical approach rather than surveys, interviews, or statistical performance measurements. Its contribution is a legal-institutional assessment that separates the allocation of competence from the practical effects that would require empirical evidence. It also develops limited reform implications grounded in the legal instruments and case material discussed in the article. The resulting analysis aims to improve conceptual clarity without assuming that a prosecutorial guideline can override statutory jurisdiction.

METHOD

This study employed normative juridical research through statutory and conceptual approaches. The statutory analysis considered the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 31 of 1997 on Military Courts, Law No. 11 of 2021 amending the Prosecutor's Office Law, Law No. 20 of 2025 on the Criminal Procedure Code, the relevant presidential and prosecutorial organizational regulations, and Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025. Law No. 8 of 1981 and the earlier organizational instruments were examined as historical legal context rather than treated as currently applicable procedure. The conceptual analysis focused on dominus litis, the single prosecution system, equality before the law, legal certainty, and the distinction between coordination and direct prosecutorial competence. The discussion compared the distribution of authority stated in these instruments with the procedural arrangements described in the guideline, including the relationship between central and regional prosecutorial units and the Oditurat. The TWP-AD case and Supreme Court Decision No. 407 K/MIL/2023 were used as documentary illustrations of connectivity proceedings, not as a representative sample or as measurements of guideline implementation. Because the study addressed legal rules and institutional responsibilities, it did not use participants, survey instruments, statistical testing, or field observations. Legal interpretations were developed by examining the consistency of each claimed institutional function with its stated legal basis and by distinguishing statutory obligations from discretionary procedural wording. The analysis was confined to normative conclusions supported by the legal materials and the previously documented case example.

The analytical sequence used to organize the statutory and conceptual examination is summarized in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Normative juridical analytical flow for the study of JAMPIDMIL authority

Figure 1 begins with the legal materials that define the respective institutional mandates. The second stage identifies the rules governing prosecution, investigation, and judicial jurisdiction. The conceptual stage explains how dominus litis, equality before the law, and legal certainty inform the reading of those rules. The comparison stage places central and regional coordination arrangements alongside statutory competence. The final stage derives narrowly framed implications for institutional reform without presenting uncollected empirical findings.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Normative findings on institutional authority

The Constitution recognizes the Prosecutor's Office as an institution performing functions connected to judicial power through the statutory legal order (Republic of Indonesia, 1945, 2009). Law No. 11 of 2021 strengthens the Attorney General's position as the highest public prosecutor while preserving the need to exercise each function according to law (Republic of Indonesia, 2021). JAMPIDMIL performs its coordinating role within this broader structure rather than constituting a separate court or an independent source of jurisdiction. The relevant organization is grounded in Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2021, the subsequent third amendment in Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2024, and the Prosecutor's Office organizational regulations (President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021, 2024). Article 57(1) of Law No. 31 of 1997 provides a distinct line of technical prosecutorial accountability for the Military Prosecutor General through the TNI Commander to the Attorney General (Republic of Indonesia, 1997). Law No. 30 of 2014 also supplies the general administrative-law background for the lawful exercise and delegation of official powers (Republic of Indonesia, 2014). The coexistence of these provisions means that organizational coordination and legal competence must be considered separately.

Before the formalization of JAMPIDMIL, the ordinary procedural picture involved separate investigative, prosecutorial, and court pathways for civilian and military suspects. The historical arrangements rested on the former KUHAP, the Military Courts Law, and related joint coordination instruments (Republic of Indonesia, 1971, 1981, 1997). The original article illustrates that structure in Figure 2 as a simplified depiction of separated civilian and military tracks. This historical depiction is useful for identifying the points at which a joint case may become fragmented, although it should not be read as a complete statement of every legally possible connectivity mechanism. Comparisons of military and ordinary judicial competence in other legal systems likewise show why questions of status, offense type, and forum allocation must be disentangled (Tahanout, 2024; Holen, 2023). The figure is therefore a reference point for the subsequent institutional analysis. Figure 2 presents the procedural tracks that informed the pre-JAMPIDMIL institutional problem.




Figure 2. Simplified civilian and military case-handling pathways before JAMPIDMIL (adapted from the original author diagram)

Figure 2 separates civilian and military suspects at the investigation stage. Civilian matters proceed through the police or authorized investigators to public prosecutors and general courts. Military matters are shown proceeding through military investigative institutions, Oditurs, and military courts. The separation illustrates how institutional responsibility can diverge even when alleged conduct arises from one joint incident. It does not independently establish the frequency of fragmented cases or replace the connectivity procedures prescribed by law.

The TWP-AD Case I illustrates the operational significance of joint civilian–military proceedings without measuring the later guideline's performance. The original source manuscript identifies a civilian defendant, Ni Putu Purnamasari, and a military defendant, retired Brigadier General Yus Adi Kamrullah, in a corruption case heard within the military judicial system. The prosecution relied on the anti-corruption framework in Law No. 31 of 1999 as amended by Law No.

20 of 2001, together with relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Republic of Indonesia, 1999, 2001). It cites Supreme Court Decision No. 407 K/MIL/2023 of 7 December 2023 and reports 16-year principal prison sentences, fines of IDR 1,000,000,000, and replacement-money orders of IDR 34,375,756,533 and IDR 80,333,490,434 for the respective defendants (Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). The case shows why prosecution, judgment enforcement, and asset recovery can require coordination across legal status and institutional boundaries. Its timing is decisive: the judgment preceded the enactment of the 2025 guideline and therefore cannot demonstrate improvement resulting from that guideline. Research on prosecutorial gatekeeping and corruption accountability provides a useful comparative explanation of why competent institutions and jurisdictional boundaries affect the legal process, without allowing an inference about Indonesian case-processing performance (Manzi, 2022; Harris & Campbell, 2024).

Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 supplies a more explicit sequence for the administrative handling of connectivity matters, from receipt of allegations through investigation, prosecution, judgment enforcement, and extraordinary remedies (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). Its procedures refer to central coordination through JAMPIDMIL and regional participation by Aspidmil, the High Prosecutor's Office, relevant prosecutors, and designated military personnel. These rules express an intention to unify prosecutorial handling and clarify the necessary links between agencies. However, assigning coordination activities across several offices does not itself answer who has final legal competence to authorize each stage. The issue becomes sharper when a guideline authorizes optional membership or when the decision to constitute a team is issued through a different organizational channel. Figure 3 reproduces the operational sequence described in the source article as an illustration of these coordination points. The stages and responsible institutions named in the guideline are summarized in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Case-handling sequence under Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 (original author diagram)

Figure 3 begins with the reporting of an alleged offense and its initial prosecutorial examination. Its middle stages show the movement from preliminary activities to joint investigation and pre-prosecution. The diagram then depicts joint prosecution, referral to the competent court, and implementation of the judgment. These steps indicate several points where prosecutors and military officials must exchange decisions and documents. The diagram represents a normative procedural sequence and does not establish actual durations, compliance levels, or institutional performance.

Three features of the guideline's institutional arrangement merit particular attention. First, its description of military participation in certain preliminary and pre-investigation activities uses optional language, which may permit a team to proceed without assigned military personnel under specified circumstances. Second, a regional joint investigation team may be constituted under a decision of the Head of the High Prosecutor's Office, while central coordination is associated with the Attorney General and JAMPIDMIL. Third, the appointment of military prosecutorial members is mediated through communication with the responsible military prosecution authorities, reflecting existing statutory and organizational lines of responsibility (Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). The resulting structure supports coordination but can leave a practical question about the channel through which divergent institutional assessments should be reconciled.

That is an interpretive concern with the procedural design, not empirical proof that particular regional offices have failed.

The 2025 Criminal Procedure Code supplies an additional statutory frame that must be read alongside the guideline. Article 170 addresses joint civilian–military offenses and their investigation; Article 171 prescribes coordination between public prosecutors and military prosecutors in determining the competent court and documentation of that determination; and Article 172 addresses court-panel composition where such offenses are heard (Republic of Indonesia, 2025). As the Code became effective on 2 January 2026, its provisions occupy a later and higher legal position than the 2025 internal guideline. A sound legal interpretation consequently distinguishes operational instructions that facilitate statutory procedures from instructions that might appear to alter their allocation of authority. The resulting question is not whether JAMPIDMIL should replace existing military actors, but whether its coordination mechanisms clearly support the legally prescribed steps of joint adjudication. This distinction avoids treating administrative centralization as an independent basis for expanding statutory competence.

Discussion

The normative findings show that the major issue is a possible mismatch between the objectives of integrated prosecution and the channels through which institutions exercise their assigned functions. The single prosecution system seeks coherence in prosecutorial policy, while the Oditurat and military investigative institutions retain responsibilities established under their governing laws. In other settings, research on prosecutors' decision-making has shown that organizational constraints and formal powers can shape prosecutorial actions in different ways (Bowman et al., 2024; Schuurmans, 2026). The Italian experience analyzed by Manzi (2022) also illustrates how jurisdictional gatekeeping may become central to institutional accountability. These comparisons cannot determine the validity of Indonesian legal provisions, but they strengthen the analytical distinction between unified objectives and separately vested competence. Reform should accordingly clarify who must act, consult, document, and decide at each statutory stage.

The optional nature of military participation during preliminary activities creates a tension between procedural flexibility and the purpose of genuinely joint handling. Flexibility can be necessary where an Aspidmil unit or a designated military officer is not yet available, but broad discretion may also weaken the institutional participation sought by the guideline. Research examining prosecutorial policy implementation cautions that formal instructions are mediated by organizational routines, management practices, and practical implementation choices (Ward et al., 2025; Willis et al., 2025). Goldrosen (2026) similarly explains how interorganizational effects may operate where legal actors do not directly command one another. On this basis, a written trigger for consultation and a documented reason for proceeding without a military participant would be more legally defensible than simply presuming such participation. This is a proposed design improvement rather than a reported finding about the frequency of military exclusion.

Regional arrangements raise a second issue because coordination authority and the power to form operational teams do not necessarily follow the same organizational pathway. Under the guideline described in the source, Aspidmil may chair a team established by the Head of the High Prosecutor's Office, while JAMPIDMIL retains a national coordinating role. The analytical risk is that technical oversight may be exercised through a chain different from the one that authorizes or staffs the regional team. Comparative scholarship on prosecutorial hierarchy and institutional independence indicates that clear rules for professional judgment and review are preferable to ambiguous informal expectations (Green & Roth, 2025; Mrowicki, 2026). Studies of institutional resilience likewise emphasize the effects of organizational structures on accountability, although they address legal systems with different constitutional designs (Bojarski, 2021; Šipulová & Kosař, 2023). An operational protocol could therefore specify reporting, escalation, and written resolution of conflicting assessments without purporting to change legally defined appointment authority.

A third issue concerns the interaction of substantive jurisdiction with the procedure used to designate the competent court. The newly effective KUHAP makes cooperation between public prosecutors and Oditurs a statutory step rather than merely a feature of internal coordination (Republic of Indonesia, 2025). Legal research on the relation between military discipline and civilian judicial guarantees supports careful scrutiny of the basis on which a defendant is brought before a

specialized forum (Holen, 2023, 2024; Tahanout, 2024). Comparative work on civilian and military experiences of justice also indicates that access to a fair forum cannot be reduced to administrative efficiency alone (Maddox, 2026; Erez & Laster, 2024). In Indonesia, the relevant solution must arise from the particular statutory test and documentation rules established by KUHAP, not from importing a foreign jurisdictional model. More explicit records of the prosecutor–Oditur determination would make the reasons for the selected forum legally more transparent.

The article's initial concern about provisions lacking express sanctions should be stated more precisely as a problem of enforceability and the consequences of procedural noncompliance. Some procedural requirements may be legally binding even where the provision does not contain a stand-alone punishment; their legal effect depends on statutory structure and available remedies. The literature on prosecutorial discretion and structured sentencing warns against broad directives whose binding force and decision standards remain obscure (Allen, 2026; Cornford, 2026; Hester, 2023). Research on court responses to prosecutorial misconduct likewise draws attention to the importance of defined forms of review (Griffiths et al., 2026; Navarro & Hansen, 2026). These studies have different legal settings and cannot establish the remedies available under Indonesian law. They nonetheless support a restrained recommendation: identify the responsible official, document required consultation, and connect procedural deficiencies to legally available review or corrective mechanisms.

Procedural efficiency must also be distinguished from the legal quality of coordination. A shorter decision chain is not automatically preferable if it obscures institutional competence or reduces opportunities for review, and an elaborate chain is not necessarily unlawful simply because it involves several offices. Research on prosecutorial guidelines and courtroom workgroups demonstrates that policy effects may depend on the responses of judges, counsel, and partner institutions rather than on the prosecutor's instruction alone (Nguyen & Ouss, 2026). Related studies emphasize that legal outcomes can also be shaped by practical capacity, documentation, and organizational context (Hartley & Tillyer, 2026; Barrenger et al., 2026). Broader research on legal information-sharing warns that expanded administrative interoperability can change institutional practice in ways not fully anticipated by the originating agency (Muñiz & Owens, 2024). For JAMPIDMIL, a more defensible notion of efficiency is therefore timely and traceable coordination within the competence established by law, not an unmeasured claim of faster prosecution.

The normative framework also carries implications for equality before the law and the public legitimacy of judicial proceedings. Comparable treatment in connectivity cases does not require eliminating all differences between military and civilian institutions; it requires legally defensible reasons when procedural treatment differs. Process-oriented research on judicial legitimacy has emphasized the cumulative significance of investigation, prosecution, and judicial decisions (Mohd Sokri, 2026; Simpson & Pappas, 2024). Work on accountability has similarly shown that a formal outcome should not be equated without further analysis with the quality of the procedure leading to it (Wood & Suzuki, 2024; Harris & Campbell, 2024). Studies of judicial independence and institutional review demonstrate why safeguards should address the manner in which officials exercise power, not simply the organizational title of the responsible office (Puleo & Coman, 2024; Sanders & Faltinat, 2026). These sources offer comparative criteria, while the governing Indonesian statutes remain the controlling basis for any legal recommendation.

The central contribution of this study is therefore a distinction between strengthening JAMPIDMIL's coordination capacity and legally enlarging its prosecutorial jurisdiction. A stronger coordination design may be achieved through mandatory written consultations at defined stages, clearer responsibility for regional reporting, explicit procedures for resolving conflicting legal assessments, and consistent documentation of forum determination under KUHAP. Comparative scholarship on legislative and judicial reform illustrates why reforms need to reflect both formal legal powers and the institutional setting within which they operate (Tew, 2024; Tepelija, 2026; Matthes, 2022). Evidence from studies of prosecution deferrals and prosecutorial communication also reminds researchers that procedural reforms can have different consequences across stages of the justice process, which must be evaluated with appropriate evidence rather than inferred from their formal adoption (Al Weswasi & Kahlmeter, 2026; Fogler et al., 2025). Because the present analysis contains no post-guideline implementation dataset, it cannot claim that these proposals will reduce

processing time or increase case completion. They are instead regulatory recommendations derived from an examination of institutional functions and the legally prescribed coordination process.

Limitations

The study is limited to the normative interpretation of institutional competence and connectivity procedures under the legal instruments discussed. It does not contain interviews, field observations, a systematic national case database, or quantitative measurements of coordination and case outcomes. The available TWP-AD case illustrates the operation of connectivity proceedings before Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 and cannot establish that guideline's subsequent effects. International publications are used to clarify analytical concepts and comparisons, not as evidence of Indonesia-specific implementation. Because the current Criminal Procedure Code began operating after the 2025 guideline was issued, further jurisprudential and empirical work may illuminate how the two legal instruments are applied together. The conclusions should therefore be read as proposals about normative coherence and institutional design, rather than measured findings about effectiveness.

CONCLUSION

JAMPIDMIL was established to support the Attorney General's statutory responsibilities in joint civilian–military criminal cases, particularly through coordination between civilian prosecutors and the Oditurat. The normative analysis identifies potential uncertainty where early military participation is discretionary, central and regional team-formation arrangements follow different chains, and coordination rules do not specify a clear route for resolving divergent institutional views. These issues warrant careful reading of Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 in conjunction with the subsequently effective Law No. 20 of 2025 on Criminal Procedure. The study does not conclude that the guideline has empirically failed; rather, it identifies areas where the written legal framework can be made more precise.

A legally proportionate approach to strengthening JAMPIDMIL would specify documentation and consultation duties, clarify reporting and escalation responsibilities between JAMPIDMIL and regional units, and align operational guidance with KUHAP provisions governing the competent court and joint procedure. Any alteration to powers reserved to military officers, public prosecutors, or the Attorney General must remain within the hierarchy of legal instruments. The TWP-AD case supports the relevance of connectivity coordination but predates the guideline and should not be treated as a post-2025 evaluation. The article's contribution is consequently an institutional and doctrinal clarification that can inform subsequent legal reform and empirical research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the Faculty of Law, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani, for providing a supportive academic environment that contributed to the development of this research. The authors also acknowledge the importance of institutional academic support in facilitating scholarly inquiry and the preparation of this manuscript. The authors take full responsibility for the content, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this study.

DECLARATION OF GENERATIVE AI

During manuscript preparation and revision, the authors used ChatGPT (OpenAI) to assist with English-language editing, organization of the academic narrative, and formatting of bibliographic entries. AI assistance did not generate research observations, original case records, interviews, or quantitative findings. The authors remain responsible for the legal interpretation, originality, factual accuracy, source selection, and final manuscript content.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS STATEMENT

WI: Conceptualization, research design, legal framework analysis, supervision, and original manuscript drafting. ZI: Methodology, statutory and regulatory analysis, literature review, and critical interpretation of research findings. FR: Legal document analysis, case examination, manuscript review and editing, reference management, and final manuscript preparation.

REFERENCES

Allen, J. (2026). "Cerberus at the gate": The fundamental connection between prosecutorial discretion and justice. *Criminal Justice Ethics*, *45*(1), 23–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2026.2644076

Al Weswasi, E., & Kahlmeter, A. (2026). Minimal intervention in the criminal justice system: The effect of prosecution deferrals on youth recidivism. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-026-09688-0

Arfianto, D. A., Pujiyono, & Cahanintyas, I. (2024). Harmonizing prosecution agencies in Indonesia: Implementing the dominus litis principle policy. *Pakistan Journal of Criminology*, *16*(1), 47–57. https://doi.org/10.62271/pjc.16.1.47.57

Arief, B. N. (2018). *Bunga rampai kebijakan hukum pidana: Perkembangan penyusunan konsep KUHP baru*. Kencana.

Barrenger, S. L., Wood, L. L., & Bonfine, N. (2026). Inner and outer contextual factors impacting mental health and criminal legal cross-systems collaborations. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, *53*, 24–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-025-01474-7

Bojarski, Ł. (2021). Civil society organizations for and with the courts and judges: Struggle for the rule of law and judicial independence: The case of Poland 1976–2020. *German Law Journal*, *22*(7), 1344–1384. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2021.72

Bowman, R., Lowrey-Kinberg, B., & Gould, J. (2024). An integrated model of prosecutor decision-making. *Law & Society Review*, *58*(3), 452–480. https://doi.org/10.1017/lsr.2024.24

Buaton, T. (2016). Peradilan militer di Indonesia di bawah kekuasaan Mahkamah Agung. In J. Rizal & Suhariyono A. R. (Eds.), *Demi keadilan: Antologi hukum pidana dan sistem peradilan pidana enam dasawarsa Harkristuti Harkrisnowo*. Pustaka Kemang.

Cornford, A. (2026). When is prosecution in the public interest? *Legal Studies*. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies/article/when-is-prosecution-in-the-public-interest/23509191B5A89648252AF5BD27FA353E

Effendy, M. (2005). *Kejaksaan RI: Posisi dan fungsinya dari perspektif hukum*. Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

Erez, E., & Laster, K. (2024). Contested victimhood: (Un)courting victims of terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2401185

Fogler, K. A. J., Imperio, C., Brewster, J., Skolnick, M. P., & Powell, A. (2025). Prosecutorial language, moral disengagement, and sentencing outcomes in real capital murder cases. *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology*, *40*, 398–404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-024-09669-8

Goldrosen, N. (2026). The interorganizational effects of reform prosecution declination policies. *Justice Quarterly*, *43*(6), 1351–1377. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2026.2643212

Green, B. A., & Roth, J. A. (2025). Subordinate prosecutors' independence. *Stetson Law Review*, *55*, 237–285. https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/1201/

Griffiths, E., Scheuerman, H. L., & Sanil, M. (2026). Not so pervasive as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial: Investigating the willingness of appellate courts to concede prosecutorial misconduct. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-026-09894-3

Harris, H., & Campbell, L. (2024). Analysing the impact of the failure to prevent bribery offence on corporate compliance reporting in the United Kingdom: Towards a better model of corporate accountability? *Griffith Law Review*, *33*(4), 456–483. https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2024.2388477

Hartley, R. D., & Tillyer, M. S. (2026). Legal and extra-legal determinants of prosecutorial case dismissal: Plea agreements, deferred adjudication, and pretrial diversion. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-026-09925-z

Hester, R. (2023). Uniformity and discretion: Lessons on reform from a failed sentencing guidelines effort. *Corrections: Policy, Practice and Research*, *8*(5), 485–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/23774657.2021.1938296

Holen, S. V. (2023). A duty to protect? Legal consciousness among military officers in armed conflict. *Journal of Law and Society*, *50*(1), 17–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12405

Holen, S. V. (2024). Crime, culture or war? Justifying military responses to violence against civilians. *Acta Sociologica*, *67*(4), 491–506. https://doi.org/10.1177/00016993241248549

Šipulová, K., & Kosař, D. (2023). Decay or erosion? The role of informal institutions in challenges faced by democratic judiciaries. *German Law Journal*, *24*, 1577–1595. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.89

Maddox, K. (2026). Military justice on trial: Insights from efforts to prosecute Japanese commanders for "denial of fair trial" in the aftermath of the Second World War. *Contemporary Japan*. https://doi.org/10.1080/18692729.2026.2631835

Manzi, L. (2022). Prosecutorial gatekeeping and its effects on criminal accountability: The Roman Prosecutor's Office and corruption investigations in Italy, 1975–1994. *Justice System Journal*, *43*(3), 445–469. https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2022.2100727

Matthes, C.-Y. (2022). Judges as activists: How Polish judges mobilise to defend the rule of law. *East European Politics*, *38*, 468–487. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2092843

Mohd Sokri, A. Y. (2026). Rethinking judicial legitimacy: A process-based perspective from Malaysian corruption trials. *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, *13*(3), 555–573. https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2026.10048

Mrowicki, M. (2026). Prosecutors' resistance against rule of law backsliding in Poland (2016–23). *International Journal of Law in Context*, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552326100615

Muñiz, A., & Owens, E. (2024). Electronic surveillance in immigration court: Evidence from the CalGang database. *Critical Criminology*, *32*, 295–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-024-09780-6

Mulyana, A. N., Manthovani, R., & Jatna, R. N. (2020). *Mandat konstitusional: Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Pidana Militer*. Rajawali Pers.

Navarro, J. C., & Hansen, M. A. (2026). An experimental study on the effect of prosecutorial Brady violations on confidence in exonerating individuals wrongfully convicted of murder. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, *22*, 433–456. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-024-09658-1

Nguyen, V., & Ouss, A. (2026). Prosecutorial guidelines and courtroom workgroups. *Justice Quarterly*, *43*(4), 849–879. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2572686

Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia. (2017). *Attorney General Regulation No. PER-006/A/JA/07/2017 concerning the organization and working procedures of the Indonesian Prosecutor's Office*.

Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia. (2024). *Prosecutorial Regulation No. 3 of 2024 concerning the fourth amendment to Attorney General Regulation No. PER-006/A/JA/07/2017*.

Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia. (2025). *Attorney General Guideline No. 2 of 2025 concerning the handling of connectivity cases and technical coordination of prosecutions conducted by the Military Prosecution Service*.

Prabandari, P. N., Sugiartha, I. N. G., & Widyantara, I. M. M. (2022). Peranan Jaksa Agung Muda Bagian Pidana Militer dalam penanganan perkara koneksitas. *Jurnal Analogi Hukum*, *4*(2), 182–186. https://doi.org/10.22225/ah.4.2.2022.182-186

President of the Republic of Indonesia. (2010). *Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2010 concerning the organization and working procedures of the Indonesian Prosecutor's Office*.

President of the Republic of Indonesia. (2021). *Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2021 concerning the second amendment to Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2010*.

President of the Republic of Indonesia. (2024). *Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2024 concerning the third amendment to Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2010 on the organization and working procedures of the Indonesian Prosecutor's Office*. https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/277489

Puleo, L., & Coman, R. (2024). Explaining judges' opposition when judicial independence is undermined: Insights from Poland, Romania, and Hungary. *Democratization*, *31*(1), 47–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2255833

Rafli, M., & Triadi, I. (2023). Eksistensi dan peranan Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Pidana Militer Pengadilan Koneksitas. *Madani: Jurnal Ilmiah Multidisiplin*, *1*(11), 334–341. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10277315

Republic of Indonesia. (1945). *The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945, as amended*.

Republic of Indonesia. (1971). *Joint Decree No. KEP/B/61/XII/1971 of the Minister of Justice, Minister of Defense and Security/Commander of the Armed Forces, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia*.
Republic of Indonesia. (1981). *Law No. 8 of 1981 concerning the Criminal Procedure Code*.
Republic of Indonesia. (1997). *Law No. 31 of 1997 concerning Military Courts*.
Republic of Indonesia. (1999). *Law No. 31 of 1999 concerning the eradication of corruption*.
Republic of Indonesia. (2001). *Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning amendments to Law No. 31 of 1999 on the eradication of corruption*.
Republic of Indonesia. (2004). *Law No. 16 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian Prosecutor's Office*.
Republic of Indonesia. (2009). *Law No. 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power*.
Republic of Indonesia. (2014). *Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration*.
Republic of Indonesia. (2021). *Law No. 11 of 2021 concerning amendments to Law No. 16 of 2004 on the Indonesian Prosecutor's Office*.
Republic of Indonesia. (2025). *Law No. 20 of 2025 concerning the Criminal Procedure Code*.
Sanders, A., & Faltinat, E. (2026). From bench to parliament and back: Resilience of the judiciary and safeguarding judicial independence in Germany. *German Law Journal*. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/from-bench-to-parliament-and-back-resilience-of-the-judiciary-and-safeguarding-judicial-independence-in-germany/4C735BDF47055A6399CC582544762A40
Schuurmans, G. (2026). The domestic prosecutor as an enforcer of ICL: Prosecutorial policy in domestic prosecutions of international crimes in the Netherlands. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, *23*(5), 733–761. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqag011
Simpson, R., & Pappas, L. N. (2024). Public perceptions of courts and cooperation with police. *Crime Science*, *13*, Article 9. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-024-00207-9
Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia. (2023, December 7). *Decision No. 407 K/MIL/2023*.
Tahanout, N. (2024). Judicial jurisdiction in crimes endangering national security between military courts and ordinary courts. *Journal of Science and Knowledge Horizons*, *4*(1). https://doi.org/10.34118/jskp.v4i01.3884
Tepelija, A. (2026). Must one indeed imagine Sisyphus happy? Recurring judicial accountability rounds as rule of law exceptions in post-communist Europe. *German Law Journal*. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/must-one-indeed-imagine-sisyphus-happy-recurring-judicial-accountability-rounds-as-rule-of-law-exceptions-in-postcommunist-europe/8375AA85A7179B2250F115F8EA2FA451
Tew, Y. (2024). Strategic judicial empowerment. *American Journal of Comparative Law*, *72*(1), 170–234. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avad040
van Sliedregt, E., & Quackelbeen, L. (2026). Emerging networks: Domestic prosecution of core international crime: Introduction. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, *23*(5), 711–716. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqag010
Ward, J. T., Vîlcică, E. R., Brey, J., Mohler, M., & Dolbear, C. (2025). Progressive prosecution policies in Philadelphia: An assessment of implementation fidelity. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, *50*, 472–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-025-09792-0
Willis, J. J., Koen, M. C., & Roubanian, G. (2025). Crisis, continuity, and change: A case study of a local prosecutor's office under COVID-19 and its implications for reform. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, *50*, 1102–1120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-025-09819-6
Wood, W. R., & Suzuki, M. (2024). Getting to accountability in restorative justice. *Victims & Offenders*, *19*(7), 1400–1423. https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2024.2333304